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Abstract
Modern machine learning is distributed and the work of several machines is typically aggregated by
averaging which is the optimal rule in terms of speed, offering a speedup of n (with respect to using a
single machine) when n processes are learning together.
Distributing data and models poses however fundamental vulnerabilities, be they to software bugs,
asynchrony, or worse, to malicious attackers controlling some machines or injecting misleading data in
the network. Such behavior is best modeled as Byzantine failures, and averaging does not tolerate a
single one from a worker.
Krum, the first provably Byzantine resilient aggregation rule for SGD only uses one worker per step,
which hampers its speed of convergence, especially in best case conditions when none of the workers is
actually Byzantine. An idea, coined multi-Krum, of using m different workers per step was mentioned,
without however any proof neither on its Byzantine resilience nor on its slowdown. More recently, it was
shown that in high dimensional machine learning, guaranteeing convergence is not a sufficient condition
for strong Byzantine resilience. A improvement on Krum, coined Bulyan, was proposed and proved to
guarantee stronger resilience. However, Bulyan suffers from the same weakness of Krum: using only
one worker per step. This adds up to the aforementioned open problem and leaves the crucial need for
both fast and strong Byzantine resilience unfulfilled.
The present paper tackles both open problems and proposes using Bulyan over Multi-Krum (we call
it MULTI-BULYAN), a combination for which we provide proofs of strong Byzantine resilience, as well
as an mn slowdown, compared to averaging, the fastest (but non Byzantine resilient) rule for distributed
machine learning.
Finally, modern machine learning involves data of unprecedentedly high dimension: some models
are nowadays vectors of dimension d = 109. In order to deliver results within a reasonable time, learning
algorithms should be at most linear in d and avoid using classic security mechanisms, most of which are
at least quadratic in d and hence impractical. A strength of MULTI-BULYAN is that it inherits the O(d)
merits of both multi-Krum and Bulyan.
*A practical implementation based on this work is described in [3], the code is available in the following Github repository:
https://github.com/LPD-EPFL/AggregaThor
†Work in progress.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing data deluge has been both a blessing and burden for machine learning system designers. A
blessing since machine learning provably performs better with more training datan [10], and a burden since
the numbers are beyond previous orders of magnitude. For instance, machine learning set of parameters are
now in the gigabyte [5], training data is several orders of magnitude beyond that [5]. For the latter reason,
distributed machine learning is not an option, it the only way to deliver results in a reasonable time for the
user. For instance, Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), an algorithm which is the workhorse of today’s
machine learning.
With the amounts of workload involved in today’s machine learning, distributed systems are the only
option to deliver results in a reasonable time.
This constraint is even more crucial since ML, given its workload, relies on large scale distributed
systems for which communications costs are additional constraints to local computation costs.
We prove the similar mn slowdown of MULTI-BULYAN and its (strong) Byzantine resilience. We deduce
that MULTI-BULYAN ensures strong Byzantine resilience and the very fact that it is mn times as fast as the
optimal algorithm (averaging) in the absence of Byzantine workers.
MULTI-BULYAN can be viewed as generalization (also using m different workers per step to leverage
the fact that f , possibly less than a minority can be faulty) of Bulyan, the defense mechanism we present
in [6]. Before presenting in Section 3, our proofs of convergence and slow down of MULTI-KRUM and in
Section 4 our proofs of convergence and slow down of BULYAN and hence MULTI-BULYAN, we introduce
in Section 2 a toolbox of formal definitions: weak, strong, and (α, f)–Byzantine resilience. We also present
a necessary context on non-convex optimization, as well as its interplay with the high dimensionality of
machine learning together with the
√
d leeway it provides to strong attackers
2 Model
2.1 Stochastic Gradient Descent
The learning task consists in making accurate predictions for the labels of each data instance ξi using a high
dimentional model (for example, a neural network); we denote the d parameters of that model by the vector
x. Each data instance has a set of features (image pixels), and a set of labels (e.g., {cat, person}). The
CNN is trained with the popular backpropagation algorithm based on SGD. Specifically, SGD addresses the
following optimization problem.
min
x∈Rd
Q(x) , EξF (x; ξ) (1)
where ξ is a random variable representing a total of B data instances and F (x; ξ) is the loss function. The
function Q(x) is smooth but not convex.
SGD computes the gradient (G(x, ξ) , ∇F (x; ξ)) and then updates the model parameters (x) in
a direction opposite to that of the gradient (descent). The vanilla SGD update rule given a sequence of
learning rates {γk} at any given step1 is the following:
x(k+1) = x(k) − γk ·G(x(k), ξ)) (2)
The popularity of SGD stems from its ability to employ noisy approximations of the actual gradient. In
a distributed setup, SGD employs a mini-batch of b < B training instances for the gradient computation:
G(x, ξ) =
b∑
i=1
G(x, ξi) (3)
1A step denotes an update in the model parameters.
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Figure 1: Correct workers (black dashed arrows) estimating the real gradient (blue full arrow) while
a Byzantine worker (red dotted)
The size of the mini-batch (b) induces a trade-off between the robustness of a given update (noise in
the gradient approximation) and the time required to compute this update. The mini-batch also affects the
amount of parallelism (Equation 3) that modern computing clusters (multi-GPU etc.) largely benefit from.
Scaling the mini-batch size to exploit additional parallelism requires however a non-trivial selection of the
sequence of learning rates [7]. A very important assumption for the convergence properties of SGD is that
each gradient is an unbiased estimation of the actual gradient, which is typically ensured through uniform
random sampling, i.e., gradients that are on expectation equal to the actual gradient (Figure 1).
2.2 Algorithms
MULTI-BULYAN relies on two algorithmic components: MULTI-KRUM [1] and BULYAN [6]. The former
rule requires that n ≥ 2f + 3 and the second requires that n ≥ 4f + 3.
Intuitively, the goal of MULTI-KRUM is to select the gradients that deviate less from the “majority” based
on their relative distances. Given gradients G1 . . .Gn proposed by workers 1 to n respectively, MULTI-
KRUM selects the m gradients with the smallest sum of scores (i.e., L2 norm from the other gradients) as
follows:
(m) arg min
i∈{1,...,n}
∑
i→j
‖Gi −Gj‖2 (4)
where given a function X(i), (m) arg min(X(i)) denotes the indexes i with the m smallest X(i) values,
and i→ j means that Gj is among the n− f − 2 closest gradients to Gi. BULYAN in turn takes the afore-
mentioned m vectors, computes their coordinate-wise median and produces a gradient which coordinates
are the average of the m− 2f closest values to the median.
2.3 Byzantine Resilience
Intuitively, weak Byzantine resilience requires a GAR to guarantee convergence despite the presence of f
Byzantine workers. It can be formally stated as follows.
Definition 1 (Weak Byzantine resilience). We say that a GAR ensures weak f -Byzantine resilience if the
sequence x(k) (Equation 2 in the main paper) converges almost surely to some x∗ where ∇Q(x∗) = 0,
despite the presence of f Byzantine workers.
On the other hand, strong Byzantine resilience requires that this convergence does not lead to ”bad”
optimums, and is related to more intricate problem of non-convex optimization, which, in the presence of
Byzantine workers, is highly aggravated by the dimension of the problem as explained in what follows.
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Figure 2: In a non-convex situation, two correct vectors (black arrows) are pointing towards the deep
optimum located in area B, both vectors belong to the plane formed by lines L1 and L2. A Byzantine
worker (magenta) is taking benefit from the third dimension, and the non-convex landscape, to place
a vector that is heading towards one of the bad local optimums of area A. This Byzantine vector is
located in the plane (L1,L3). Due to the variance of the correct workers on the plane (L1,L2), the
Byzantine one has a budget of about
√
3 times the disagreement of the correct workers, to put as a
deviation towards A, on the line (L3), while still being selected by a weak Byzantine resilient GAR,
since its projection on the plane (L1,L2) lies exactly on the line (L1), unlike that of the correct workers.
In very high dimensions, the situation is amplified by
√
d.
Specificity of non-convex optimization. Non-convex optimization is one of the earliest established NP-
hard problems [8]. In fact, many interesting but hard questions in machine learning boil down to one answer:
”because the cost function is not necessarily convex”.
In distributed machine learning, the non-convexity of the cost function creates two non-intuitive be-
haviours that are important to highlight.
(1) A ”mild” Byzantine worker can make the system converge faster. For instance, it has been reported
several times in the literature that noise accelerates learning [2, 8]. This can be understood from the ”S”
(stochasticity) of SGD: as (correct) workers cannot have a full picture of the surrounding landscape of the
loss, they can only draw a sample at random and estimate the best direction based on that sample, which
can be, and is probably biased compared to the true gradient. Moreover, due to non-convexity, even the true
gradient might be leading to the local minima where the parameter server is. By providing a wrong direction
(i.e. not the true gradient, or a correct stochastic estimation), a Byzantine worker whose resources cannot
face the high-dimensional landscape of the loss, might end up providing a direction to get out of that local
minima.
(2) Combined with high dimensional issues, non-convexity explains the need for strong Byzantine re-
silience. Unlike the ”mild” Byzantine worker, a strong adversary with more resources than the workers and
the server, can see a larger picture and provide an attack that requires a stronger requirement. Namely, a
requirement that would cut the
√
d leeway offered to an attacker in each dimension. Figure 2 provides an
illustration.
This motivates the following formalization of strong Byzantine resilience.
Definition 2 (Strong Byzantine resilience). We say that a GAR ensures strong f -Byzantine resilient if for
every i ∈ [1, d], there exists a correct gradientG (i.e., computed by a non-Byzantine worker) s.t. E|GARi−
Gi| = O( 1√d). The the expectation is taken over the random samples (ξ in Equation 1)and vi denotes the
4
ith coordinate of a vector v.
Weak vs. strong Byzantine resilience. To attack non-Byzantine resilientGARs such as averaging, it only
takes the computation of an estimate of the gradient, which can be done inO(n.d) operations per round by a
Byzantine worker. This attack is reasonably cheap: within the usual cost of the workload of other workers,
O(d), and the server, O(n.d).
To attack weakly Byzantine-resilient GARs however, one needs to find the ’most legitimate but harmful
vector possible’, i.e one that will (1) be selected by a weakly Byzantine-resilient GAR, and (2) be mislead-
ing convergence (red arrow in Figure 1). To find this vector, an attacker has to first collect every correct
worker’s vector (before they reach the server), and solve an optimization problem (by linear regression)
to approximate this harmful but legitimate vector [6]. If the desired quality of the approximation is , the
Byzantine worker would need at least Ω(n.d ) operation to reach it with regression. This is a tight lower
bound for a regression problem in d dimensions with n vectors [8]. In practice, if the required precision
is of order 10−9, with 100 workers and a neural network model of dimension 109, the cost of the attack
becomes quickly prohibitive (≈ 1020 operations to be done in each step by the attacker).
To summarize, weak Byzantine resilience can be enough as a practical solution against attackers whose
resources are comparable to the server’s. However, strong Byzantine resilience remains the only provable
solution against attackers with significant resources.
For the sake of our theoretical analysis, we also recall the definition of (α, f)–Byzantine resilience [1]
(Definition 3). This definition is a sufficient condition (as proved in [1] based on [2]) for weak Byzantine
resilience.Even-though the property of (α, f)–Byzantine resilience is a sufficient, but not a necessary con-
dition for (weak) Byzantine resilience, it has been so far used as the defacto standard [1, 4, 11] to guarantee
(weak) Byzantine resilience for SGD. We will therefore follow this standard and require (α, f)–Byzantine
resilience from anyGAR that is plugged into MULTI-BULYAN, in particular, we will require it from MULTI-
KRUM. The theoretical analysis done in [6] guarantees that BULYAN inherits it.
Intuitively, Definition 3 states that the gradient aggregation rule GAR produces an output vector that
lives, on average (over random samples used by SGD), in the cone of angle α around the true gradient. We
simply call this the ”correct cone”.
Definition 3 ((α, f)–Byzantine resilience (as in [1])). Let 0 ≤ α < pi/2 be any angular value, and any
integer 0 ≤ f ≤ n. Let V1, . . . , Vn be any independent identically distributed random vectors in Rd,
Vi ∼ G, with EG = g. Let B1, . . . , Bf be any random vectors in Rd, possibly dependent on the Vi’s. An
aggregation rule GAR is said to be (α, f)-Byzantine resilient if, for any 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jf ≤ n, vector
GAR = GAR(V1, . . . , B1︸︷︷︸
j1
, . . . , Bf︸︷︷︸
jf
, . . . , Vn)
satisfies (i) 〈EGAR, g〉 ≥ (1− sinα) · ‖g‖2 > 0 2 and (ii) for r = 2, 3, 4, E ‖GAR‖r is bounded above by
a linear combination of terms E ‖G‖r1 . . .E ‖G‖rn−1 with r1 + · · ·+ rn−1 = r.
Choice of f . The properties of the existing Byzantine-resilient SGD algorithms all depend on one impor-
tant parameter, i.e., the number of potentially Byzantine nodes f . It is important to notice that f denotes
a contract between the designer of the fault-tolerant solution and the user of the solution (who implements
a service on top of the solution and deploys it in a specific setting). As long as the number of Byzantine
workers is less than f , the solution is safe. Fixing an optimal value for f is an orthogonal problem. For
2Having a scalar product that is lower bounded by this value guarantees that the GAR of MULTI-KRUM lives in the aformen-
tioned cone. For a visualisation of this requirement, see the ball and inner triangle of Figure 3
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example, if daily failures in a data center are about 1%, f = 0.01.n would be a suggested choice to tune the
algorithm, and suffer from only a 99% slowdown.
The performance (convergence time) of certain existing Byzantine-resilient SGD algorithms in a non-
Byzantine environment is independent of the choice of f . These algorithms do not exploit the full potential
of the choice of f . Modern large-scale systems are versatile and often undergo important structural changes
while providing online services (e.g., addition or maintenance of certain worker nodes). Intuitively, there
should be a fine granularity between the level of pessimism (i.e., value of f ) and the performance of the
SGD algorithm in the setting with no Byzantine failures.
3 MULTI-KRUM: Weak Byzantine Resilience and Slowdown
Let n be any integer greater than 2, f any integer s.t f ≤ n−22 and m an integer s.t m ≤ n − f − 2. Let
m˜ = n− f − 2.
We first prove the (α, f)–Byzantine resilience of MULTI-KRUM (Lemma 1), then prove its almost sure
convergence (Lemma 2) based on that, which proves the weak Byzantine resilience of MULTI-KRUM (The-
orem 1).
In all what follows, expectations are taken over random samples used by correct workers to estimate the
gradient, i.e the ”S” (stochasticity) that is inherent to SGD. It is worth noting that this analysis in expecta-
tion is not an average case analysis from the point of view of Byzantine fault tolerance. For instance, the
Byzantine worker is always assumed to follow arbitrarily bad policies and the analysis is a worst-case one.
The Byzantine resilience proof (Lemma 1) relies on the following observation: given m ≤ n − f − 2,
and in particular m = n − f − 2 3, m-Krum averages m gradients that are all in the ”correct cone”, and
a cone is a convex set, thus stable by averaging. The resulting vectors therefore also live in that cone. The
angle of the cone will depend on a variable η(n.f) as in [1], the value of η(n.f) itself depends on m. This is
what enables us to use multi-Krum as the basis of our MULTI-KRUM, unlike [1] where a restriction is made
on m = 1.
The proof of Lemma 2 is the same as the one in [1] which itself draws on the rather classic analysis of
SGD made by L.Bottou [2]. The key concepts are (1) a global confinement of the sequence of parameter
vectors and (2) a bound on the statistical moments of the random sequence of estimators built by the GAR
of MULTI-KRUM. As in [1, 2], reasonable assumptions are made on the cost function Q, those assumption
are not restrictive and are common in practical machine learning.
Theorem 1 (Byzantine resilience and slowdown of MULTI-KRUM). Letm be any integer s.t. m ≤ n−f−2.
(i) MULTI-KRUM has weak Byzantine resilience against f failures. (ii) In the absence of Byzantine workers,
MULTI-KRUM has a slowdown (expressed in ratio with averaging) of Ω( m˜n ).
Proof. Proof of (i). To prove (i), we will require Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, then conclude by construction of
MULTI-KRUM as a multi-Krum algorithm with m = n− f − 2.
Lemma 1. Let V1, . . . , Vn be any independent and identically distributed random d-dimensional vectors
s.t Vi ∼ G, with EG = g and E ‖G− g‖2 = dσ2. Let B1, . . . , Bf be any f random vectors, possibly
dependent on the Vi’s. If 2f + 2 < n and η(n, f)
√
d · σ < ‖g‖, where
η(n, f) =
def
√
2
(
n− f + f ·m+ f
2 · (m+ 1)
m
)
,
3The slowdown question is an incentive to take the highest value ofm among those that satisfy Byzantine resilience, in this case
m˜.
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then the GAR function of MULTI-KRUM is (α, f)-Byzantine resilient where 0 ≤ α < pi/2 is defined by
sinα =
η(n, f) · √d · σ
‖g‖ .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the Byzantine vectors B1, . . . , Bf occupy the last f posi-
tions in the list of arguments of MULTI-KRUM, i.e., MULTI-KRUM = MULTI-KRUM(V1, . . . , Vn−f , B1, . . . , Bf ).
An index is correct if it refers to a vector among V1, . . . , Vn−f . An index is Byzantine if it refers to a vector
among B1, . . . , Bf . For each index (correct or Byzantine) i, we denote by δc(i) (resp. δb(i)) the number of
correct (resp. Byzantine) indices j such that i → j (the notation we introduced in Section 3 when defining
MULTI-KRUM), i.e the number of workers, among the m neighbors of i that are correct (resp. Byzantine).
We have
δc(i)+δb(i) = m
n− 2f − 2 ≤δc(i) ≤ m
δb(i) ≤ f.
We focus first on the condition (i) of (α, f)-Byzantine resilience. We determine an upper bound on the
squared distance ‖EMULTI-KRUM − g‖2. Note that, for any correct j, EVj = g. We denote by i∗ the index
of the worst scoring among the m vectors chosen by the MULTI-KRUM function, i.e one that ranks with the
mth smallest score in Equation 5 of the main paper (Section 3).
‖EMULTI-KRUM − g‖2 ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥E
MULTI-KRUM − 1
δc(i∗)
∑
i∗→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ E
∥∥∥∥∥∥MULTI-KRUM − 1δc(i∗)
∑
i∗→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(Jensen inequality)
≤
∑
correct i
E
∥∥∥∥∥∥Vi − 1δc(i)
∑
i→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
I(i∗ = i)
+
∑
byz k
E
∥∥∥∥∥∥Bk − 1δc(k)
∑
k→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
I(i∗ = k)
where I denotes the indicator function4. We examine the case i∗ = i for some correct index i.∥∥∥∥∥∥Vi − 1δc(i)
∑
i→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1δc(i)
∑
i→ correct j
Vi − Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
δc(i)
∑
i→ correct j
‖Vi − Vj‖2 (Jensen inequality)
E
∥∥∥∥∥∥Vi − 1δc(i)
∑
i→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
δc(i)
∑
i→ correct j
E ‖Vi − Vj‖2
4I(P ) equals 1 if the predicate P is true, and 0 otherwise.
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≤ 2dσ2.
We now examine the case i∗ = k for some Byzantine index k. The fact that k minimizes the score implies
that for all correct indices i∑
k→ correct j
‖Bk − Vj‖2 +
∑
k→ byz l
‖Bk −Bl‖2 ≤
∑
i→ correct j
‖Vi − Vj‖2 +
∑
i→ byz l
‖Vi −Bl‖2 .
Then, for all correct indices i∥∥∥∥∥∥Bk − 1δc(k)
∑
k→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
δc(k)
∑
k→ correct j
‖Bk − Vj‖2
≤ 1
δc(k)
∑
i→ correct j
‖Vi − Vj‖2 + 1
δc(k)
∑
i→ byz l
‖Vi −Bl‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2(i)
.
We focus on the term D2(i). Each correct process i has m neighbors, and f + 1 non-neighbors. Thus there
exists a correct worker ζ(i) which is farther from i than any of the neighbors of i. In particular, for each
Byzantine index l such that i→ l, ‖Vi −Bl‖2 ≤
∥∥Vi − Vζ(i)∥∥2. Whence∥∥∥∥∥∥Bk − 1δc(k)
∑
k→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
δc(k)
∑
i→ correct j
‖Vi − Vj‖2 + δb(i)
δc(k)
∥∥Vi − Vζ(i)∥∥2
E
∥∥∥∥∥∥Bk − 1δc(k)
∑
k→ correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ δc(i)
δc(k)
· 2dσ2 + δb(i)
δc(k)
∑
correct j 6=i
E ‖Vi − Vj‖2 I(ζ(i) = j)
≤
(
δc(i)
δc(k)
·+ δb(i)
δc(k)
(m+ 1)
)
2dσ2
≤
(
m
n− 2f − 2 +
f
n− 2f − 2 · (m+ 1)
)
2dσ2.
Putting everything back together, we obtain
‖EMULTI-KRUM − g‖2 ≤ (n− f)2dσ2 + f ·
(
m
n− 2f − 2 +
f
n− 2f − 2 · (m+ 1)
)
2dσ2
≤ 2
(
n− f + f ·m+ f
2 · (m+ 1)
n− 2f − 2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
η2(n,f)
dσ2.
By assumption, η(n, f)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, i.e., EMULTI-KRUM belongs to a ball centered at g with radius η(n, f)·√
d · σ. This implies
〈EMULTI-KRUM, g〉 ≥
(
‖g‖ − η(n, f) ·
√
d · σ
)
· ‖g‖ = (1− sinα) · ‖g‖2.
To sum up, condition (i) of the (α, f)-Byzantine resilience property holds. We now focus on condition (ii).
E‖MULTI-KRUM‖r =
∑
correct i
E ‖Vi‖r I(i∗ = i) +
∑
byz k
E ‖Bk‖r I(i∗ = k)
8
≤ (n− f)E ‖G‖r +
∑
byz k
E ‖Bk‖r I(i∗ = k).
Denoting by C a generic constant, when i∗ = k, we have for all correct indices i∥∥∥∥∥∥Bk − 1δc(k)
∑
k→correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
√√√√ 1
δc(k)
∑
i→ correct j
‖Vi − Vj‖2 + δb(i)
δc(k)
∥∥Vi − Vζ(i)∥∥2
≤ C ·
√ 1
δc(k)
·
∑
i→correct j
‖Vi − Vj‖+
√
δb(i)
δc(k)
· ∥∥Vi − Vζ(i)∥∥

≤ C ·
∑
correct j
‖Vj‖ (triangular inequality).
The second inequality comes from the equivalence of norms in finite dimension. Now
‖Bk‖ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥Bk − 1δc(k)
∑
k→correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1δc(k)
∑
k→correct j
Vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ C ·
∑
correct j
‖Vj‖
‖Bk‖r ≤ C ·
∑
r1+···+rn−f=r
‖V1‖r1 · · · ‖Vn−f‖rn−f .
Since the Vi’s are independent, we finally obtain that E ‖MULTI-KRUM‖r is bounded above by a linear
combination of terms of the form E ‖V1‖r1 · · ·E ‖Vn−f‖rn−f = E ‖G‖r1 · · ·E ‖G‖rn−f with r1 + · · · +
rn−f = r. This completes the proof of condition (ii).
Lemma 2. Assume that (i) the cost function Q is three times differentiable with continuous derivatives, and
is non-negative, Q(x) ≥ 0; (ii) the learning rates satisfy ∑t γt = ∞ and ∑t γ2t < ∞; (iii) the gradient
estimator satisfies EG(x, ξ) = ∇Q(x) and ∀r ∈ {2, . . . , 4}, E‖G(x, ξ)‖r ≤ Ar + Br‖x‖r for some
constants Ar, Br; (iv) there exists a constant 0 ≤ α < pi/2 such that for all x
η(n, f) ·
√
d · σ(x) ≤ ‖∇Q(x)‖ · sinα;
(v) finally, beyond a certain horizon, ‖x‖2 ≥ D, there exist  > 0 and 0 ≤ β < pi/2− α such that
‖∇Q(x)‖ ≥  > 0
〈x,∇Q(x)〉
‖x‖ · ‖∇Q(x)‖ ≥ cosβ.
Then the sequence of gradients∇Q(xt) converges almost surely to zero.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we write MULTI-KRUMt = MULTI-KRUM(V t1 , . . . , V
t
n). Before proving
the main claim of the proposition, we first show that the sequence xt is almost surely globally confined
within the region ‖x‖2 ≤ D.
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(Global confinement). Let ut = φ(‖xt‖2) where
φ(a) =
{
0 if a < D
(a−D)2 otherwise
Note that
φ(b)− φ(a) ≤ (b− a)φ′(a) + (b− a)2. (5)
This becomes an equality when a, b ≥ D. Applying this inequality to ut+1 − ut yields
ut+1 − ut ≤
(−2γt〈xt,MULTI-KRUMt〉+ γ2t ‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2) · φ′(‖xt‖2)
+ 4γ2t 〈xt,MULTI-KRUMt〉2 − 4γ3t 〈xt,MULTI-KRUMt〉‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2 + γ4t ‖MULTI-KRUMt‖4
≤ −2γt〈xt,MULTI-KRUMt〉φ′(‖xt‖2) + γ2t ‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2φ′(‖xt‖2)
+ 4γ2t ‖xt‖2‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2 + 4γ3t ‖xt‖‖MULTI-KRUMt‖3 + γ4t ‖MULTI-KRUMt‖4.
Let Pt denote the σ-algebra encoding all the information up to round t. Taking the conditional expectation
with respect to Pt yields
E (ut+1 − ut|Pt) ≤ −2γt〈xt,EMULTI-KRUMt〉+ γ2t E
(‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2)φ′(‖xt‖2)
+ 4γ2t ‖xt‖2E
(‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2)+ 4γ3t ‖xt‖E (‖MULTI-KRUMt‖3)+ γ4t E (‖MULTI-KRUMt‖4) .
Thanks to condition (ii) of (α, f)-Byzantine resilience, and the assumption on the first four moments of G,
there exist positive constants A0, B0 such that
E (ut+1 − ut|Pt) ≤ −2γt〈xt,EMULTI-KRUMt〉φ′(‖xt‖2) + γ2t
(
A0 +B0‖xt‖4
)
.
Thus, there exist positive constant A,B such that
E (ut+1 − ut|Pt) ≤ −2γt〈xt,EMULTI-KRUMt〉φ′(‖xt‖2) + γ2t (A+B · ut) .
When ‖xt‖2 < D, the first term of the right hand side is null because φ′(‖xt‖2) = 0. When ‖xt‖2 ≥ D,
this first term is negative because (see Figure 3)
〈xt,EMULTI-KRUMt〉 ≥ ‖xt‖ · ‖EMULTI-KRUMt‖ · cos(α+ β) > 0.
Hence
E (ut+1 − ut|Pt) ≤ γ2t (A+B · ut) .
We define two auxiliary sequences
µt =
t∏
i=1
1
1− γ2iB
−−−→
t→∞ µ∞
u′t = µtut.
Note that the sequence µt converges because
∑
t γ
2
t <∞. Then
E
(
u′t+1 − u′t|Pt
) ≤ γ2t µtA.
Consider the indicator of the positive variations of the left-hand side
χt =
{
1 if E
(
u′t+1 − u′t|Pt
)
> 0
0 otherwise
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Then
E
(
χt · (u′t+1 − u′t)
) ≤ E (χt · E (u′t+1 − u′t|Pt)) ≤ γ2t µtA.
The right-hand side of the previous inequality is the summand of a convergent series. By the quasi-
martingale convergence theorem [9], this shows that the sequence u′t converges almost surely, which in
turn shows that the sequence ut converges almost surely, ut → u∞ ≥ 0.
Let us assume that u∞ > 0. When t is large enough, this implies that ‖xt‖2 and ‖xt+1‖2 are greater
than D. Inequality 5 becomes an equality, which implies that the following infinite sum converges almost
surely
∞∑
t=1
γt〈xt,EMULTI-KRUMt〉φ′(‖xt‖2) <∞.
Note that the sequence φ′(‖xt‖2) converges to a positive value. In the region ‖xt‖2 > D, we have
〈xt,EMULTI-KRUMt〉 ≥
√
D · ‖EMULTI-KRUMt‖ · cos(α+ β)
≥
√
D ·
(
‖∇Q(xt)‖ − η(n, f) ·
√
d · σ(xt)
)
· cos(α+ β)
≥
√
D ·  · (1− sinα) · cos(α+ β) > 0.
This contradicts the fact that
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞. Therefore, the sequence ut converges to zero. This con-
vergence implies that the sequence ‖xt‖2 is bounded, i.e., the vector xt is confined in a bounded region
containing the origin. As a consequence, any continuous function of xt is also bounded, such as, e.g., ‖xt‖2,
E ‖G(xt, ξ)‖2 and all the derivatives of the cost function Q(xt). In the sequel, positive constants K1,K2,
etc. . . are introduced whenever such a bound is used.
(Convergence). We proceed to show that the gradient∇Q(xt) converges almost surely to zero. We define
ht = Q(xt).
Using a first-order Taylor expansion and bounding the second derivative with K1, we obtain
|ht+1 − ht + 2γt〈MULTI-KRUMt,∇Q(xt)〉| ≤ γ2t ‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2K1 a.s.
Therefore
E (ht+1 − ht|Pt) ≤ −2γt〈EMULTI-KRUMt,∇Q(xt)〉+ γ2t E
(‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2|Pt)K1. (6)
By the properties of (α, f)-Byzantine resiliency, this implies
E (ht+1 − ht|Pt) ≤ γ2tK2K1,
which in turn implies that the positive variations of ht are also bounded
E (χt · (ht+1 − ht)) ≤ γ2tK2K1.
The right-hand side is the summand of a convergent infinite sum. By the quasi-martingale convergence
theorem, the sequence ht converges almost surely, Q(xt)→ Q∞.
Taking the expectation of Inequality 6, and summing on t = 1, . . . ,∞, the convergence ofQ(xt) implies
that ∞∑
t=1
γt〈EMULTI-KRUMt,∇Q(xt)〉 <∞ a.s.
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Figure 3: Condition on the angles between xt, ∇Q(xt) and the the GAR of MULTI-KRUM vector
EMULTI-KRUMt, in the region ‖xt‖2 > D.
We now define
ρt = ‖∇Q(xt)‖2 .
Using a Taylor expansion, as demonstrated for the variations of ht, we obtain
ρt+1 − ρt ≤ −2γt〈MULTI-KRUMt,
(∇2Q(xt)) · ∇Q(xt)〉+ γ2t ‖MULTI-KRUMt‖2K3 a.s.
Taking the conditional expectation, and bounding the second derivatives by K4,
E (ρt+1 − ρt|Pt) ≤ 2γt〈EMULTI-KRUMt,∇Q(xt)〉K4 + γ2tK2K3.
The positive expected variations of ρt are bounded
E (χt · (ρt+1 − ρt)) ≤ 2γtE〈EMULTI-KRUMt,∇Q(xt)〉K4 + γ2tK2K3.
The two terms on the right-hand side are the summands of convergent infinite series. By the quasi-martingale
convergence theorem, this shows that ρt converges almost surely.
We have
〈EMULTI-KRUMt,∇Q(xt)〉 ≥
(
‖∇Q(xt)‖ − η(n, f) ·
√
d · σ(xt)
)
· ‖∇Q(xt)‖
≥ (1− sinα)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·ρt.
This implies that the following infinite series converge almost surely
∞∑
t=1
γt · ρt <∞.
Since ρt converges almost surely, and the series
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞ diverges, we conclude that the sequence
‖∇Q(xt)‖ converges almost surely to zero.
We conclude the proof of (i) by recalling the definition of MULTI-KRUM, as the instance of m−Krum
with m = n− f − 2.
Proof of (ii). (ii) is a consequence of the fact that m-Krum is the average of m estimators of the gradient.
In the absence of Byzantine workers, all those estimators will not only be from the ”correct cone”, but from
correct workers (Byzantine workers can also be in the correct cone, but in this case there are none). As
SGD converges in O( 1m), where m is the number of used estimators of the gradient, the slowdown result
follows.
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4 MULTI-BULYAN: Strong Byzantine Resilience and Slowdown
Let n be any integer greater than 2, f any integer s.t f ≤ n−34 and m an integer s.t m ≤ n − 2f − 2. Let
m˜ = n− 2f − 2.
Theorem 2 (Byzantine resilience and slowdown of MULTI-BULYAN). (i) MULTI-BULYAN provides strong
Byzantine resilience against f failures. (ii) In the absence of Byzantine workers, MULTI-BULYAN has a
slowdown (expressed in ratio with averaging) of Ω( m˜n ).
Proof. If the number of iterations over MULTI-KRUM is n− 2f , then the leeway, defined by the coordinate-
wise distance between the output of BULYAN and a correct gradient is upper bounded byO( 1√
d
). This is due
to the fact that BULYAN relies on a component-wise median, that, as proven in [6] guarantees this bound.
The proof is then a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and the properties of Bulyan [6].
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